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Abstract
We consider the problem of obtaining coherence in a propositional
knowledge base using techniques from Belief Change. Our motivation
comes from the field of formal ontologies where coherence is inter-
preted to mean that a concept name has to be satisfiable. In the proposi-
tional case we consider here, this translates to a propositional formula
being satisfiable. We define belief change operators in a framework
of nonmonotonic preferential reasoning. We show how the introduc-
tion of defeasible information using contraction operators can be an
effective means for obtaining coherence.
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario in which we are presented with the following information about
red blood cells: Avian red blood cells and mammalian red blood cells are vertebrate
red blood cells, and vertebrate red blood cells have a cell membrane. Also, vertebrate
red blood cells have a nucleus, but mammalian red blood cells don’t. In a propositional
knowledge base, this information can be represented as follows: taÑ v,mÑ v, v Ñ
n,mÑ  nu. An obvious problem with this formulation is the consequence that mam-
malian red blood cells don’t exist (mÑ K). We can be reasonably certain that this type
of modelling is not what was intended. In the Description Logic (DL) community the
analogous problem (i.e. when DL concept names are not satisfiable) is referred to as in-
coherence [15], and we shall adopt the same terminology for the propositional context.
Our goal here is to consider a generalised version of coherence for which a designated
complex concept has to be satisfiable. In the propositional case this translates to ensur-
ing that a designated formula has to be satisfiable. The techniques we develop can be
extended to deal with the coherence of a knowledge base (all atoms have to be satisfi-
able), or requiring that a selected set of formulas be simultaneously satisfiable w.r.t. a
∗Pre-print version of the paper has been published by AAAI Press in the volume Proceedings of the
15th International Conference on Principle of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR-16). The
published version can be purchased and downloaded at: http://www.aaai.org/Press/Proceedings/kr16.php
†Universite´ du Luxembourg, Luxembourg. email: giovanni.casini@uni.lu
‡CAIR (CSIR and University of Cape Town), South Africa. email: tmeyer@cs.uct.ac.za
1
knowledge base.
The standard approach for achieving coherence is closely related to classical belief
base contraction [8]: coherence w.r.t. the atom p is obtained via a base contraction of
the formula  p, thereby ensuring the satisfiability of p. In this paper we investigate
mechanisms for obtaining propositional coherence by applying techniques developed
in the area of Belief Change, but unlike the standard approaches our version of belief
change is applied to a logic for defeasible reasoning. The motivation for our approach
is based on the observation that the reason for incoherence in a knowledge base can
frequently be traced back to a lack of expressivity in the logic used for representing
the knowledge. For example, when stating that vertebrate red blood cells have a nu-
cleus, what the knowledge engineers probably had in mind is that vertebrate red cells
usually have a nucleus, with mammalian red blood cells being an exception. While
(classical) propositional logic is not able to deal with exceptions, there are a range of
nonmonotonic formalisms capable of doing so, thereby enabling us to obtain coher-
ence. We consider the approach, mainly developed by Lehmann and Magidor [13], in
which conditionals of the form C |„D (defeasible information) are added to the lan-
guage of propositional logic (with C and D being classical propositional formulas). In
this enriched language, equipped with the entailment relation known as Rational Clo-
sure, the information about vertebrate blood cells usually having a nucleus would be
expressible as v |„n. This shift allows us to restore coherence by substituting selected
bits of classical information with their defeasible counterparts instead of eliminating
them completely, as most approaches do. In our example above, substituting v Ñ n
(vertebrate red blood cells have a nucleus) with v |„n (vertebrate red blood cells usu-
ally have a nucleus) results in a coherent defeasible knowledge base.
2 Background
We consider a finitely generated propositional languageLwith lower case letters a, b, c, . . .
denoting atoms, and capital letters A,B,C, . . . denoting elements of L. We consider
the language L$ of (classical) conditionals of the form C $ D (for C,D P L), with a
conditional C $ D being semantically equivalent to the implication C Ñ D. It is thus
easily seen that the logic based on L$ is exactly as expressive as the propositional logic
based on L. We extend L$ by introducing the language L|„ consisting of all elements
of L$, as well as defeasible conditionals of the form C |„ D (for C,D P L). Clas-
sical conditionals can be viewed as propositional versions of classical subsumptions
occurring in DL TBoxes [2], while defeasible conditionals are propositional versions
of defeasible subsumptions [6]. In this paper we skip the semantic characterisation
of defeasible conditionals [13], except to note that classical conditionals can be rep-
resented as defeasible ones: R , C $ D iff R , C ^  D |„ K. We sometimes
abuse notation by using C ^  D |„ K to refer to classical conditionals. We consider
conditional knowledge bases K consisting of finite sets of classical and defeasible con-
ditionals. The notion of entailment that we associate with this semantics is Rational
Closure (RC) [13]. Let ÝÑK “ tC Ñ D | C $ D P K or C |„ D P Ku; through
a series of classical propositional decision steps over the set ÝÑK and the set AK of the
antecedents of the conditionals in K (AK “ tC | C Ă„D P Ku) we assign a rank rKpCq
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to every formula C, where rKpCq is either a natural number or 8. The rank of C |„D
w.r.t. K, rKpC |„Dq, is equal to the rank associated with its antecedent rKpCq. Intu-
itively, the rank of a defeasible conditional indicates its level of defeasibility: the lower
the rank, the more likely we are to discard it. The rank of C $ D is 8, which is also
the rank of its defeasible counterpart C ^  D |„K. For i P t0, . . . , n ´ 1,8u we let
Ki “ tC |„D P K | rKpC |„Dq “ iu, and we let Kă8 “ KzK8. The RC of K,
(rc, is defined as follows: K (rc C |„D iff rKpCq ă rKpC ^  D) or rKpCq “ 8.
We let RCpKq “ tC |„D | K (rc C |„Du. We extend the notion of coherence to
conditional knowledge bases: C is coherent for K iff K *rc C $ K iff K *rc C |„K.
K is inconsistent iff K (rc J $ K. Two knowledge bases are rank equivalent iff their
Rational Closures are equal.
We chose to use RC in this paper for a number of reasons. Most importantly, below
we are going to investigate a form of belief contraction of conditionals of the form C |„
K. It turns out that all the prominent entailment relations proposed in the preferential
framework, e.g. [11, 13, 12, 4, 3], are equivalent for such conditionals (C |„ K is a
consequence of K in one of them iff it is a consequence in all of them). So, if we
model a contraction operator for RC, we can immediately apply the same operator to
all the other entailment relations in this family. Note that only one half of the Deduction
Theorem holds for defeasible conditionals in the context of RC, but the other direction
doesn’t.
Proposition 1 If K (rc C ^ D |„E then K (rc C |„  D _ E. However, it may be
that K *rc C ^D |„E when K (rc C |„ D _ E.
So, C |„ D _ E can be viewed as a weakening of C ^D |„E in the context of RC,
a result which forms the crux of the notion of weakening that we will be employing.
3 Simple Weakening
In this section we present an initial proposal for obtaining coherence for a formula C
w.r.t. a classical conditional knowledge base K$. In developing the proposal we adopt
the techniques used in kernel-contraction [8]. A kernel for C $ K in K$ is a set of
conditionals K1 Ď K$ s.t. K1 ( C $ K and for every K2 Ă K1,K2 * C $ K. We
denote the set of kernels for C $ K in K$ by K$ (pC |„Kq.
To explain the principle behind the proposal, we return to our red blood cell example.
Let K$ “ ta $ v,m $ v, v $ n,m $  nu, and assume we attempt to obtain co-
herence for m. To do so we identify the kernels for m. In this case there is one: tm $
v, v $ n,m $  nu. Classical kernel-contraction would remove some non-empty sub-
set of this kernel, making the resulting set coherent for m. We propose instead to iden-
tify those elements of the kernel best suited for weakening and to replace one of them
with its defeasible counterpart. To decide which elements are best suited for weaken-
ing, we consider the complete weakening of K$: K|„ “ tC |„D | C $ D P K$u,
in our case K|„ “ ta |„ v,m |„ v, v |„ n,m |„  nu. We use the rank of the elements
of the complete weakening to identify those best suited for weakening—the lower the
rank, the more suited a conditional is for weakening. In our example the conditional
v |„ n has the lowest rank, 0, and we end up with the conditional knowledge base
K´m$K “ ta $ v,m $ v, v |„n,m $  nu. Observe that m is coherent for K´m$K.
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More generally, consider a classical conditional KBK$ and a formulaC. ForK1 Ď K$,
we let minrpK1q “ tD $ E Ď K1 | rK|„pD |„Eq ď rK|„pF |„Gq for every F $ G P
K1u, and we let σ be a choice function σ :PpK$q ÝÑ K$ such thatH Ă σpK1q Ď K1.
Furthermore, let Kw “ tD $ E | D $ E P σpminrpJqq for some J P K$ (pC |„Kqu.




C$K :“ K$zKw Y tD |„E | D $ E P Kwu.
Proposition 2 K$
´σ
C$K *rc C $ K if and only if for every set K1 in K$ (pC |„ Kq the
rank of the elements of minrpK1q w.r.t. K|„ is less than8.
The procedure for Simple Weakening we describe above is simple, elegant, and easy to
implement, since reasoning can be reduced to classical propositional reasoning. Also,
this proposal is immediately applicable and implementable for DLs as well. However,
it is strongly syntax-dependent, and it does not always obtain coherence. Consider the
knowledge base ta ^  v $ K,m ^  v $ K, v ^  n $ K, m ^ n $ Ku, in which
every formula is logically equivalent to one in our original knowledge base. In this case
the defeasible versions are not weaker than their strict counterparts (they all have rank
8). Hence none of the potential solutions provided by Simple Weakening renders m
coherent. In the next section we consider a more nuanced version of weakening which
eliminates these drawbacks.
4 Nuanced Weakening
In this section we present Nuanced Weakening as a form of contraction of a conditional
knowledge base K for which conditionals of the form C |„ K are contracted. Unlike
Simple Weakening, it is always successful in obtaining coherence, and is more faithful
to the Principle of Minimal Change. Like Simple Weakening, it is easily implementable
since it can be reduced to classical propositional reasoning.
It can be viewed as a contraction operator on theories (logically closed sets of formulas)
since we obtain a weakening of K. That is, we obtain a new knowledge base K1 (which
is not necessarily a subset of K) s.t. K (rc C |„D for every conditional C |„D P K1.
But it can also be viewed as a belief base contraction operator once we have applied a
form of completion to K. So Nuanced Weakening is, in some sense, a hybrid between
theory and base contraction. Our approach has a number of advantages. The fact that
information is weakened instead of eliminated ensures that the Principle of Minimal
Change is taken into account. Also, a foundationalist approach, has two important ad-
vantages. It ensures that the Principle of Categorical Matching is satisfied (we start
with a base and end with one), making iteration immediately possible, and it eases
the move to the application of our techniques for simultaneously obtaining coherence
for all concept names in formal ontologies represented as Description Logics. In that
context, the representation of ontologies is foundationalist. In fact, optimised software
tools for identifying kernels (referred to as justifications in the DL community) already
exist [9].
First, note that the entailment of statements of the form C |„K depends solely on those
elements of K with rank8, and can be reduced to classical propositional reasoning.
Proposition 3 K (rc C |„K iff K8 (rc C |„K iff ÝÑK8 (  C.
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Next we define a form of completion of K that will allow us to use a propositional
contraction operator over ÝÑK8 and minimise the loss of information, just implementing
a minimal amount of weakening of the information. So, we start with a finite set K of
(classical and defeasible) conditionals, and apply the following transformation:
1. We translate all the classical conditionalsC $ D inK to their defeasible versions
C ^ D |„K
2.Then we rewrite the antecedents of all the conditionals in K to be in conjunctive
normal form, restricted to the atoms occurring in the antecedent. Every conditional will
have the form
Ź
Γ |„D, where Γ is a set of propositional clauses.
3. For each conditional
Ź
Γ |„D P K, and for every Γ1 Ă Γ we also add to K the
conditional
Ź
Γ1 |„D _Žt C | C P ΓzΓ1u, whereŹH is defined as J.
The basic idea behind the above transformation is to add to K all the possible weak-
enings of a conditional that can be obtained via the application of Proposition 1. For
example, p $ q is rewritten into p^ q |„K, and then add to K the weaker defeasible
conditionals p |„K_  q,  q |„K_ p, and J |„K_ p_  q. In the rest of the
section we will consider that a KB K is completed as described.
Example 1 Consider again the knowledge base in our red blood cell example. First,
we rewrite K as ta ^  v |„ K,m ^  v |„ K, v ^  n |„ K, m ^ n |„ Ku (the
antecedents are already in conjunctive normal form). Then we complete the knowledge
base by adding the weakened versions of the conditionals to obtainK1. For example, for
m^ v |„K, we will also addm |„K_  v, v |„K_ m, andJ |„K_ m_  v.
And similarly for the other conditionals inK. Observe that these weakened conditionals
are equivalent (w.r.t. RC) to m |„ v,  v |„ m, and J |„ m_ v. To ease readability
we perform similar logically equivalent transformations in our examples.
Later we’ll see that only the first two steps of the above completion of K actually need
to be performed, and that the third step can be simulated without explicitly introducing
any new conditionals into K. We are now ready to define our contraction operator.
Assume we have a conditional knowledge base K that has been completed as described
above, and a conditionalC |„Kwith which we want to contract. We are going to define
a standard kernel-base operator with a minor twist. From Proposition 3 we know that
we need to define kernels only with respect to K8. So, let K8 (pC |„ Kq be the set of
the kernels of C |„K w.r.t. K8. Following the standard kernel approach, we define an
incision function σ as a choice function that chooses at least one element in every set
in K8 (pC |„Kq. In particular, σ must satisfy the following conditions to be an incision
function ([8], Definition 2.30):
1. σpK8 (pC |„Kqq Ď ŤrpK8 (pC |„Kqq;
2. If H ‰ X P K8 (pC |„Kq, then X X σpK8 (pC |„Kqq ‰ H.
We let the Nuanced Weakening of K for C be the result obtained by the contraction
operator X which is defined as KXpC|„Kq “ KzσpK8 (pC |„Kqq.
Example 2 Consider the knowledge K1 from Example 1. The conditionals below each
line are weaker than the ones above, and their ranks are indicated with a superscript:
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a^ v |„K8
a |„v0  v |„ a0
J|„ a_ v0
m^ v |„K8
m |„v8  v |„ m0
J|„ m_ v0
v ^ n |„K8
v |„n0  n |„ v0
J|„ v _ n0
m^ n |„K8
m |„ n8 n |„ m0
J|„ m_ n0
The boxed conditionals are the ones ocurring in some kernel for m |„K. There are
four possible kernels, each containing three conditionals: v^ n |„K and exactly one
conditional from each of the remaining two groups. An incision function σ will choose
at least one element from each kernel, eliminating it from the knowledge base.
In propositional logic kernel contraction is characterised by a set of postulates: Suc-
cess, Inclusion, Core-retainment, and Uniformity ([8], Theorem 2.32). These postulates
can be reformulated for our contraction operation X as follows:
‚ Success: If C |„K R RCpHq then C |„K R RCpKXC|„Kq;‚ Inclusion: KXC|„K Ď K;
‚ Core-retainement: If D |„ E P K and D |„ E R KXC|„K, then there is a K1 s.t.
K1 Ď K and C |„K R RCpK1q and C |„K P RCpK1 Y tD |„Euq;
‚ Uniformity: If for all K1 Ď K it holds that C |„K P RCpK1q iff D |„K P RCpK1q,
then KXC|„K “ KXD|„K;
where K is a conditional KB completed as described above. It is easy to prove the
correspondent representation theorem for our conditional contraction.
Proposition 4 (Representation Theorem for Kernel Conditional Contraction.) The
operator X is an of operator that satisfies Success, Inclusion, Core-retainement, and
Uniformity, and every operator satisfying such properties can be modelled as a X-
operator.
Nuanced Weakening overcomes some of the limits that we have pointed out about
Simple Weakening, but it has some problems as well. The completion procedure is
quite cumbersome, and the kind of contraction we have presented, a simple kernel-
contraction, despite being easily implementable (especially in view of an adaptation
for Description Logics), is not really satisfying from the point of view of the Principle
of Minimal Change. There are various refinement that we can implement in order to
overcome such limits, that we will not be able to properly present here.
Dealing with the issue about the complexity of the completion procedure, we can ac-
tually ease it a lot, avoiding the actual construction and introduction in the KB of new
conditionals. As mentioned in the Background section, we can decide the ranking of
every conditional in K using ÝÑK and the set AK “ tŹΓ | ŹΓ Ă„D P Ku, contain-
ing the antecedents of the conditionals in K. Once that every formula in AK is into its
conjunctive normal form
Ź
Γ, we can prove that we can actually ‘simulate’ the kernel
contraction described above by extending AK with the formulas
Ź
Θ, with Θ Ă Γ
for some
Ź
Γ P AK. Once we do such a step, it is also possible to refine this kernel-
contraction procedure in order minimising the loss of information, up to defining a
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maxichoice contraction operator [1], that from the point of view of minimising change
is the most appealing approach. When dealing with theories (closed under entailment)
such an approach can give back counterintuitive results [1], but when working with
finite bases this approach is considered desirable [8].
Finally, the present contraction operations over conditionals C Ă„ K, beyond that for
dealing with the problem of coherence, can be used to define a general revision oper-
ator over a conditional KB, that is, a class of operators that, given a conditional KB K
and a conditionalC Ă„D, allows to define a new KBK˚C Ă„ D
that guarantees to contains
C Ă„D while preserving logical consistency.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we combine formal tools taken from the Belief Revision and the Non-
monotonic Reasoning communities in order to define belief change operators that are
appropriate for enforcing coherence in conditional knowledge bases, minimising the
loss of information. The proposed operators are easily implementable. Even though
the procedures presented here are not computationally tractable, from a practical per-
spective Horridge [9] has shown that computing kernels is frequently feasible even for
large DL ontologies.
With the exception of the work of Kern-Isberner [10], which is not directly relevant
to ours, we are not aware of any work about the dynamics of conditional knowledge.
Our proposal can be used to develop a class of belief revision operators for condi-
tional knowledge bases on the basis of the introduced contraction operators. Also, we
plan to extend these results to Description Logics (DLs). Much of the content of this
paper is already applicable to DLs. Furthermore, the decision procedures for the main
inference operations in the framework of preferential reasoning have already been de-
fined for DLs [14, 6, 4, 3, 7, 5]. So the only remaining obstacle for a DL version of
Nuanced Weakening is the definition of a proper normal form to be used in substitution
of the version of conjunctive normal form used in Nuanced Weakening. Beyond that, a
proper analysis of iterated and multiple base contraction is needed, and an analysis of
the same belief change problems in the framework of logically closed theories, more
in line with an AGM-style analysis is also possible.
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